Independence and impartiality
The principles of independence and impartiality were restated by the ECtHR as follows:
The Court recalls that in determining whether a body can be considered as “independent” – notably of the executive and of the parties to the case – regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and the duration of their term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance of independence … Furthermore, the irremovability of judges by the executive during their term of office must in general be considered as a corollary of their independence and thus included in the guarantees of Article 6 § 1. The Court further recalls that the requisite guarantees of independence apply not only to a “tribunal” within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, but also extend to “the judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power” referred to in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.
The Court further reiterates that it is of fundamental importance in a democratic society that the courts inspire confidence in the public. To that end, Article 6 requires a tribunal falling within its scope to be impartial. Impartiality normally denotes the absence of prejudice or bias and its existence or otherwise can be tested in various ways. The Court has thus distinguished between a subjective approach – that is, endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction or interest of a given judge in a particular case – and an objective approach – that is, determining whether he or she offered sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect.
In applying the subjective test, the Court has consistently held that the personal impartiality of a judge must be presumed until there is proof to the contrary. As regards the type of proof required, the Court has, for example, sought to ascertain whether a judge has displayed hostility or ill will or has arranged to have a case assigned to himself for personal reasons. The principle that a tribunal shall be presumed to be free of personal prejudice or partiality is long-established in the case-law of the Court.
Although in some cases it may be difficult to procure evidence with which to rebut the presumption, it must be remembered that the requirement of objective impartiality provides a further important guarantee. In other words, the Court has recognised the difficulty of establishing a breach of Article 6 on account of subjective partiality and for this reason has, in the vast majority of cases raising impartiality issues, focused on the objective test. However, there is no watertight division between the two notions, since the conduct of a judge may not only prompt objectively held misgivings as to impartiality from the point of view of the external observer (the objective test) but may also go to the issue of his or her personal conviction (the subjective test)
As to the second test, when applied to a body sitting as a bench, it means determining whether, quite apart from the personal conduct of any of the members of that body, there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to its impartiality. In this respect, even appearances may be of some importance. When it is being decided whether in a given case there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular body lacks impartiality, the standpoint of those claiming that it is not impartial is important but not decisive. What is decisive is whether the fear can be held to be objectively justified.
Pohoska v Poland  ECHR 4 (Although no personal bias was alleged Article 6(1) had been violated where the applicant’s neighbour, and opponent in a number of the cases, happened to be the brother of a supervising judge at the Regional Court.)
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