Standard of Proof
The law has drawn a clear distinction between probability as it applies to past facts and probability as it applies to future predictions. Past facts must be proved to have happened on the balance of probabilities, that is, that it is more likely than not that they did happen. Predictions about future facts need only be based upon a degree of likelihood that they will happen which is sufficient to justify preventive action. This will depend upon the nature and gravity of the harm: a lesser degree of likelihood that the child will be killed will justify immediate preventive action than the degree of likelihood that the child will not be sent to school.
In the case of S-B Children, Re  UKSC 17 the Supreme Court found it necessary to re-visit the decision of the House of Lords in the case of Re B ( Children ) (Care Proceedings: Standard of Proof)  UKHL 35, [ 2009 ] AC 11. Although the case concerned the proper approach to deciding who has been responsible for harming a child in proceedings taken to protect that child, and others in the family, from harm some aspects of the judgment are of interest in disciplinary and regulatory proceedings.
Lady Hale, giving the judgment of the court said that ‘the problem had arisen, as Lord Hoffmann explained, because of dicta which suggested that the standard of proof might vary with the gravity of the misconduct alleged or even the seriousness of the consequences for the person concerned. He pointed out that the cases in which such statements were made fell into three categories. In the first were cases which the law classed as civil but in which the criminal standard was appropriate. Into this category came sex offender orders and anti-social behaviour orders: see B v Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Constabulary  1 WLR 340 and R (McCann) v Crown Court at Manchester  UKHL 39,  1 AC 787. In the second were cases which were not about the standard of proof at all, but about the quality of evidence. If an event is inherently improbable, it may take better evidence to persuade the judge that it has happened than would be required if the event were a commonplace. This was what Lord Nicholls was discussing in Re H (Minors), above, at p 586. Yet, despite the care that Lord Nicholls had taken to explain that having regard to the inherent probabilities did not mean that the standard of proof was higher, others had referred to a "heightened standard of proof" where the allegations were serious. In the third category, therefore, were cases in which the judges were simply confused about whether they were talking about the standard of proof or the role of inherent probabilities in deciding whether it had been discharged. Apart from cases in the first category, therefore, "the time has come to say, once and for all, that there is only one civil standard of proof and that is proof that that the fact in issue more probably occurred than not".’
5th Edition » | Chapter 12